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Abstract  
 
Globalization of the Steel Industry 
 
By 
Myung-Hak Hwang 
 
 
Steel is the vital and basic engineering material, underpinning all industrial 
development. Today consumption of steel is running at around 750 million tonnes a 
year, and world demand for steel is likely to grow for the foreseeable future. While 
steel is sold across international markets, it is primarily produced and supplied by 
national rather than global companies. The globalization of the steel producers is 
realized by way of the following processes: the progression of steel industry ownership 
from the state to the private sector, intra-regional alliances and consolidation, joint 
ventures with foreign partners, and finally full globalization. In this thesis, POSCO 
will be reviewed as a successful case of globalization. The successful companies in the 
future are likely to be embracing new technologies, be internationally cost competitive, 
and financially focused. They are also likely to have a network of strategic partners and 
joint ventures, with a much greater flexibility than has been exhibited by companies in 
the past. 
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Part I. Introduction 
 
It is considered that steel production capacity is one measure of an economy. The steel 
industry is one of the fundamental industries in both developed and developing countries.  
Those countries that have tried to make economic development schemes concentrated 
their efforts on fostering their steel industries. Leading countries such as USA and 
Western European countries have developed their steel industries in that way. Japan has 
also devoted its efforts on expanding its steel production capacity during the economic 
development period. Emerging countries such as South Korea and Brazil have set their 
steel industries No.1 position in economic development plans. Many developing countries 
already have significant steel production capacitie s or developing their steel industries 
based on their plans.  
 
Steel industry has several characteristics. It is a capital- intensive industry that requires 
huge capital (facility) investment. It requires huge resources and needs various kinds of 
raw materials and energies as inputs. Also, this industry has a big influence to other 
industries. Accordingly, the countries which could produce better steel products more 
cheaply, are more competitive in the industries that use steel products for their raw 
materials. Besides, steel industry has a characteristic such that it can not control the 
imbalance between supply and demand easily. In the economic recession, steel producers 
can not easily reduce their supplies, even though steel demands decrease, so the steel 
product price can fall sharply. On the contrary, in the economic boom, steel prices rise 
quickly, because steel producers can not expand their capacity in a short period. There is 
significant economies of scale in this industry. It means that entry barrier is very high due 
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to the burden of huge initial investment needed. Besides, in the steel industry, the choice 
of production base is very important, because the flow of material is an important factor in 
the securing of competitiveness.  
 
1. Scope of the Study 
This study focuses mainly on the globalization process of steel companies in North 
America, Europe and Asia. Part II reviews the globalization of the world steel producers. 
The structural changes in the steel industry and forces at work will also be examined in 
this part. In Part III, POSCO’s case will be reviewed as a specific case study of 
globalization. POSCO is the world’s largest steel producer, with 1998 crude steel 
production of 25.57 million tons. POSCO was founded in 1968, and in fewer than 30 
years, became the world’s largest steel producer. In POSCO’s case, performance analysis 
of globalization and future tasks and directions will be reviewed. 
 
2. Methods of the Study 
This study depends largely on literature research and case studies. Datas have been 
collected from various steel industry research reports, several companies’ CEO speeches, 
and POSCO’s publicly available information. Additional data and information were also 
obtained from Internet sites and recently published company reports. 
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Part II. Globalization of the Steel Industry 
 
1. Structural Changes of the World Steel Industry 
 
1). Rapid Development of Innovative Steel Technology 
Historically, technology has been an important influence in the steel industry. For example 
the countries that developed or introduced innovative steel technologies timely have 
established leadership in the world steel industry. From the 18th century to the end of 19th 
century, the U.K that invented the technology of Bessmer converter and blast furnace 
using coals took the leadership in the world steel industry. From the early 20th century to 
1996, the U.S.A led world steel industry with the technology of open-hearth furnace, 
electric arc furnace, and economy of scale, and continuous rolling machine. Until the  
early 1990s, Japan had been the leader with its technology of Big blast furnace, LD 
converter, casting machines. Presently, the world steel market is moving toward perfect 
competition with the development of globalization and liberalization. With the recognition 
of the importance of innovative steel technology, the speed of steel technology 
development is becoming faster and the technology cycle has shortened. Technology 
development within the steel industry is advanced predominantly in the areas of steel 
manufacturing process, finished steel products, and manufacturing environment. 
Manufacturing processes have become much more efficient through technology 
improvements. They have made energy reduction possible. New technology drove the 
steel industry to develop new products so that they could compete with aluminum and 
plastic products. Another significant change is that steel manufacturers can now operate 
their production facilities with improved environmental considerations. In the future, the 
 4 
steel industry will undergo more dramatic changes due to new innovative technology such 
as SRP (smelting reduction process) and Near Net Shape Casting. 
 
<Graph 1-1>The Relationship between Competitive Environment & Innovative Technology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : POSCO, “The Current Situation and Lookout of the Steel Industry and 
Innovative Steel Technology ” 1997.5 
 
2). The Era of Competition 
 
a) The Changing System of Competition in the World Steel Industry 
The World steel market is becoming more competitive. This high leve l of competition has 
made the steel business more difficult. The following are some of the reasons for the 
competitive steel market. Firstly, with regard to prospects in the medium to long-term, 
world steel demand is expected to increase, but the possibility of imbalance of steel 
demand and supply is expected to be very high due to the increasing steel production 
capacity of each country. Secondly, China, East Asia, Middle and South America, are 
likely to become new leading groups as they develop their steel industries. Thirdly, 
advanced countries such as USA, Japan, Germany, which lost their competitive 
advantages in the 1970s – 1980s, are recovering their competitive powers by restructuring. 
Production Cost 
High             Cost curve having slow technology development. 
                                                The difference of cost competitiveness 
                                            due to technology innovation.  
                                           
 Cost curve having fast technology development. 
Low                                       
      Past(Low)               Time(Intensity of Competition)       Future(High) 
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Fourthly, because of Thin Slab Casting technology and Direct Electric Arc Furnace 
technology, Mini-mill produces flat products as well as long products. In accordance with 
this, it can be forecasted that future competition of the steel industry will be much more 
severe in securing profitability and flexibility of manufacturing via minimization of 
facility scales, and globalization, and diversification. 
 
b) Recovery of Competence in the Steel Industry of the Developed Countries 
The steel industry was lead by the developed countries until the 1970s, when, it 
experienced two oil shocks and a subsequent economic recession. However, after the 
down-turn, the steel industries of developed countries are now recovering their 
competitiveness, increasing their production capacities and steel product exports. They 
achieved this success through resolute rationalization, continuous cost-saving efforts and 
the development of new technologies. Since 1980, to regain competitiveness, Japan and 
the USA retired their old equipment, which made them improve their profitability. Due to 
this, they could improve their operating rates from 80% to 90%. Moreover, with the 
introduction of the autonomous facilities such as continuous casting, the ratio of 
continuous casting has been improved to 90% in 1996 from below 60% in 1980. Through 
the retirement of old equipment and with the introduction of autonomous facilities, they 
could save labor cost and, therefore improve efficiency greatly. During the period of 
1980~96, Japan cut its steel industry labor force by about 50%. The USA also reduced its 
labor force by 65%. As a result, average work-hour per ton to produce flat steel in Japan 
was reduced to 4.24 in 1996 from 8.76 in 1980, achieving the best level in the world steel 
industry.  
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 <Table1-1> Change of Main Indexes of Steel Industry between Japan and USA  
 
 
 
 
 
   Source : World Steel Dynamics, Steel Strategist # 18-23, New York, 1992-1997 
 
c) Changes in the Steel Market after Development of Mini-mill 
After the 1990s, one of the distinct changes in the world steel industry is electric arc 
furnace, that is, Mini-mill. In the USA, South Korea and Mexico the market share of 
Mini-mill products has been enlarged through replacing blast furnace products. Mini-mill 
producers are likely to keep enlarging their market shares because Mini-mill has many 
advantages: the small capital investment owing to adopting the electric arc furnace 
facilities and the superior production elasticity. As technology such as direct current arc 
furnace, and shin slab casting, became practical to use, flat production such as hot-rolled 
coils, cold-rolled flats, which could be produced only in the integrated steel plants in the 
past, could now be produced by Mini-mill technology. 
 
3). Changes in Trading Patterns of the Steel Industry  
 
a) Changes in Trading Patterns of the Steel  Industry  
In general, trade in the world steel market is on the rise. This is due to the increase in 
               Unit      ‘80(A)       ‘96(B)         B-A 
               Japan  USA   Japan   USA  Japan  USA 
Crude Steel Capacity. M ton 138.6 128.0 110.8 105.3 -27.8 -22.7 
Operation Rate of Steel Making   %   79.3  80.4  89.2   91.1 9.9 10.7 
Continuous Casting Ratio   %        59.5  20.3  96.4  93.2 36.9 72.9 
Work Force  Thousand 375 399 189 138 -186 -261 
MH/T    -   8.76 10.28 4.24 4.28 -4.52 -6.00 
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demand of developing countries, the growth of steel trades amount among developed 
countries, the innovation of logistics and distribution systems, and tariff reduction with 
the idea of free trade. 
 
          <Table1-2> The World Steel Production and Export        (M ton) 
     Year       Export (A)  Production (B)    Export Ratio(A/B,%) 
     1950               20.5            192.0             10.7 
     1960               52.7            345.5             15.3 
     1970              116.1            595.3             19.5 
     1980              140.7            578.7             24.3 
     1985              170.4            598.2             28.5 
     1990              168.3            654.4             25.7 
     1992              177.6            620.2             28.6 
 Source : IISI, World Steel , Annual Report 
 
As well as the increase in trade, structural changes are occurring in the steel market. First, 
trade within economic blocs are growing. More trade and transactions within an economic 
bloc make trade barriers high for those outside bloc. 
  
                 <Table 1-3> Steel Trade Ratio by Region  
                                       Trend (%) 
                   1976          1986           1995         1996  
   USA 34 39 44 61 
 E U 58 56 71 67 
 South Korea  8 48 82 80 
 Japan 34 60 79 79 
Note : In cases of Korea and Japan, Bloc means the area of East Asia 
Source : Iron & Steel Statistical Bureau, World Steel Exports, London, Annual Issues 
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Second, Asia is becoming the center of the world steel trade. Between 1995 and 2005, the 
growth ratio of crude steel consumption in the developing Asian countries (except Japan) 
is expected to be 4% per annum, and market share is expected to become over 40%.  
 
b) Possibility of Trading Disputes and Current Trading Environment  
Trade policies of each country need strategic adjustments in order to reduce the disputes 
arising from companies, countries, and problems caused by rapid progress of free trade, 
and globalization. Nowadays, each country is opening its market and reducing tariffs with 
its target to be duty-free by 2005, which is a WTO agreement. The idea of seeking 
liberalization of trade is distorted by market protection policy in each country, and high 
barriers among economic blocs. One of the noticeable changes in the world steel market is 
that trade related lawsuits, which used to be predominantly instituted by the USA, are 
increasing in South American and East Asian countries. This is because Russia began to 
increase its export of very low-priced steel products. The number of lawsuits against 
Russian steel companies increased rapidly from 1996. Most of the lawsuits against Russia 
are instituted by America, EU, South American countries, East Asian countries and South 
Korea. Consequently, the world steel market will be more competitive and difficult to 
understand because there will be more competitors, and therefore, more variables to 
calculate.  
 
4) Globalization of Steel Industry 
 
a) Decrease in Strategic Importance of Steel Industry  
One of the important reasons that the world steel industry is vigorously seeking 
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globalization is the relatively low strategic importance of steel industry. This means that 
the strategic importance of the steel industry as a national prestige industry or national 
defense industry has been weakened in accordance with the end of the cold war and 
advancement of industry structure. This change appeared with the privatization of 
government owned companies. The beginning of this was the privatization of BS in U.K 
in 1988. Usinor, ILVA, followed in Europe. Within developing countries, CSN in Brazil, 
NASCO in Philippines also became privatized. Thus, the ratio of privatizations in the steel 
industry in the Western world increased to 82% in 1995 from 69% in 1987.  
 
             <Table 1-4> Selected Steel Company Privatization 
Company Country Year Company Country Year 
CAP  Chile 1987  Usinor France 1995 
British Steel        U.K   1988  Ispat Karmet Kazakhastan 1995 
Iscor           South Africa 1989  China Steel  Taiwan 1995 
ISCOTT (Caribbean) Trinidad 1989      Irish Ispat Ireland    1996 
Usiminas  Brazil  1991   Dalmine     Italy        1996 
CST              Brazil  1992      Siderperu       Peru      1996 
Ispat Mexicana     Mexico  1992  Sidor          Venezuela   1997 
CSN              Brazil 1993 Aceralia  Spain     1998 
Source : J.P Morgan Securities Inc. 
 
The companies that were privatized, pushed forward positively to make strategic alliances 
within companies for the purpose of attracting foreign capital along with liberalization of 
investment and financial markets, quickly resulting in globalization within the world steel 
industry.  
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<Chart 1-1> Stages of Steel Industry Development 
 
 
 
 
Regions  
  
 
Companies 
 
 
Source : JPMS 
 
Chart 1 outlines stages that countries and companies in the steel industry have made 
progressed so far. The first step towards globalization started with the merger of several 
state-owned companies in a country into one group. Most of the countries in the world 
already passed this stage. After that, the steel companies were privatized. New owners 
quickly rationalized facilities to maximize the potential of their initial investment. These 
operationally improved steel companies sought strategic alliances and consolidation 
opportunities to grow and protect their existing markets. After that, steel producers 
typically formed joint ventures with foreign partners in order to obtain technical know-
how and gain access to new foreign customers. After these steps have done, globalization 
was usually the last step for the companies. 
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b) World-Wide Proliferation of High Technology  
It is true that historically there were high entrance barriers for the steel industry because 
huge amount of capital investment was required. However, as steel production technology 
became developed more and more, Mini-mill could build the low cost, high productive 
manufacturing system through simplification of the processes of works, and accordingly 
could decrease huge amount of capital investment. 
 
c) Cases and Patterns of Globalization  
The mainstream of foreign direct investment is M&A. The other type is strategic alliance 
between companies. For strategic alliance, it is very important to harmony alliance 
partner’s capability with its own strategy. Among all steel companies in the world, 
Japanese steel makers have globalized through strategic alliance. Meanwhile, M&A is 
used to acquire the economy of scale and to expand market share rapidly. One of the 
typical companies that have applied M&A strategy most sprightly is the Ispat 
International N.V that constructed the global production bases in six countries through 
taking over steel companies, which were in the process of privatization from government 
owned companies  
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2. Forces at Work 
 
For all that movement of technology has been relatively vigorous among prominent world 
steel companies through licensing or trading for several decades after World War II, it was          
very rare case that a steel making company operated its production facilities in many 
countries. It was because that each country fostered its steel industry as its own mainstay 
industry through its industrialization efforts. However, globalization of capital investment 
in the steel industry made a new start since 1970s, and this trend has been accelerated 
much more after 1980s. Following factors influenced the steel industry globalization: 
structural changes of the steel industry itself; globalization of steel-demand industry 
(example, globalization of automobile industry).  
 
The companies in developed countries such as the USA, Japan, Germany, France, and 
U.K could not help going through reorganization after early 1970s. These integrated steel 
companies that produced a wide range of steel products at that time experienced a sharp 
drop of operating rates of facilities, and had a hard time in arranging extra facilities due to 
the entry of Mini-mill and the steel supply enlargement of the other OECD areas. 
Consequently, consolidation has been proceeded within companies in the world steel 
industry, and they also focused their efforts on producing such products as high value–
added and high technology needed. The huge capital investment in technical innovation 
was necessity in order to make steel products high value added. Thus, joint venture was 
considered more an appealing alternative rather than the single investment of capital in 
facilities and technology. Besides, the world steel producers have driven diverse strategies 
aiming to assure competitiveness copying with the changes of steel industry-environment. 
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One of these strategies is the globalization strategy. This strategy has been taken under 
development of steel technology, changes of steel market conditions, relaxation of 
government regulation, and changes of international investment-environment. 
 
Generally, the strategic motivations for globalization can be classified as follows. 1) The 
market expansion through strategic alliance with steel demand-industry; this was a typical 
strategy of Japanese steel makers. 2) New overseas market development with its own 
effort. 3) Foreign investments; this acquired economic efficiency of investment, and 
synergy effect in the process of steel industry reorganization. 4) Global outsourcing for 
obtaining raw materials that was not sufficient in its country. 5) Cost reduction, or profit 
enhancement through building steel material supply basis such as scrap substitutes, raw 
materials. 6) Tariffs and the other duties reduction. 7) Minimal government regulations 
regarding taxation, competition, environmental standards, and procurement. 8) 
Enhancement of capability in distribution and sales. 9) Acquirement technical and 
marketing capabilities. 
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3. Regional Overview  
 
3-1. North America 
In the case of the integrated steel industry, the international FDI (Foreign Direct 
Investment) and alliance have been mainly generated between Japanese steel producers 
and US producers in North America. In 1981 almost all US steel producers had already 
made an agreement with Japan on receiving technical support. For instance, US Steel 
(USS) made an agreement with Nippon Steel on the synthetic technical support, and an 
agreement with Sumitomo metal company on the technical support for cold-rolled and 
continuous casting. Bethlehem Steel also, was provided with technical assistance for 
enhancement of productivity by Nippon Steel and Kawasaki Steel, and Inland Steel was 
provided with technical support for converters by Nippon Steel. Armco was also provided 
with work plant diagnosis by Nippon Steel. In the middle of 1980,the technical alliance 
between Japan and US has been developed to the level of sharing stocks between the two 
countries’ steel producers; NKK acquired 50% of National Steel’s stocks in 1984,and 
expanded to 74% in April, 1993. This technical alliance between these two countries was 
attributed to the influence of globalization of Japanese automobile industry in 1980s. Also 
Mini-Mills was not an exception to globalization, so the success of the US Mini-Mills has 
accelerated FDI and cooperation from Japan and Europe through contacts. In addition to 
integrated steel mills and Min-Mills, globalization also accrued in the non-cored area of 
the steel industry. That is, the “service center” was responsible for the following roles; 
purchasing the steel product from the integrated steel mill or Mini-Mill, and processing 
them according to the demands of end users. In this area the advance of Europe stood out 
prominently, and Sweden and Germany went into this industry early, followed by the 
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trader of Japan. 
 
1) U. S. Steel Group 
 
USX Corporation’s U.S Steel Group (USS) is the largest steel producer in North America, 
at 12.35 million tons of raw steel production in 1997. It is also arguably the most 
internationally aligned producer in the United States, as it has several joint ventures (both 
in the United States and abroad) with foreign partners. The aim of USS’s international 
joint ventures (and with its domestic ventures as well) is to enhance profitability, diversify 
risk wider geographical and product lines, share capital resources and technology, and 
develop new market and customers. U.S. Steel is also focusing on the improvement of its 
existing franchise, to obtain higher earnings growth. The three elements to this strategy 
are to boost performance of existing operations, to serve value-added markets, and to 
improve the balance sheet. Capital investments, largely to improve operations and the 
product mix, reached about $340 million in 1998. These include a reline of the Gary No.6 
blast furnace and improvements to a Gary coke battery, expansion of a galvanizing line at 
Fairless Works, and conversion of the tube mill at Fairfield from blooms to rounds. 
Capital expenditures amounted to $261 million in 1997, with such major projects as a 
blast furnace reline at the Mon Valley Works, a new $40 million heating-treat line at the 
160-inch plate mill at Gary, and environmental spending at Gary. The company’s 
financial obligations declined by $567million in 1997, reflecting the cash provided by 
operations and asset sales. In April 1997, U.S. Steel Group announced the sale of a stake 
in three coke batteries at its Clariton Works to two undisclosed limited partners for 
approximately $360million. The three batteries produce about 1.5million tons of coke 
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annually. In total, Clariton has 12 coke batteries (with more than 800 ovens), which 
produce 6.8 million tones of coke annually. U.S. Steel Group, a unit of USX Corp., 
includes U.S. Steel, the nation’s largest steel producer in terms of annual crude steel 
production. It is engaged primarily in the production and sale of a wide range of steel mill 
products and raw materials (coke and taconite pellets).  
 
U.S Steel has a 9.6% market share of the finished steel apparent consumption in the 
United States and an 11.4% share of finished steel shipments by U.S. producers. U.S. 
Steel has four primary facilities: Gary Works in Indiana, Fairfield Works in Alabama, 
Mon Valley Works in Pennsylvania, and Fairless Works in Pennsylvania (near 
Philadelphia). The Fairless Works is a finishing mill only; the former three are fully 
integrated facilities. U.S. Steel Group also includes the management of mineral resources, 
domestic coal mining, engineering and consulting service, and technology licensing. 
Other businesses include real estate development and management, fencing products, 
leasing and financing activities, and a majority interest in a titanium metal products 
company. Headquartered in Pittsburgh, PA. U.S. Steel Group employed an average of 
20,276 people in 1998. Joint Ventures (JVs) are essential facet of the vision strategy. 
Among their many advantages, JVs enhance US Steel’s position with existing customers, 
create access to new customers, target emerging markets, provide an acceptable level of 
risk, offer synergies with US Steel’s core facilities and provide a favorable rate of return. 
  
VSZ U.S Steel 
In November 1997, U.S. Steel announced plans for a 50/50 joint venture in Kosice, 
Slovakia, with VSZ a.s. for the production and marketing of tin products to emerging 
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central Europe. It was known that U.S. Steel’s investment was reached about $60 million. 
In February 1998, the joint venture assumed ownership and commenced operation of an 
existing tin mill facility (VSZ’s Ocel plant in Kosice) with an annual production capacity 
of 140,000 metric tons. The joint venture plans to add 200,000 annual metric tons of tin 
mill production capacity in the next two years. This is the second international joint 
venture for U.S. Steel. Its first was Acero Prime, a steel processor and warehouse in San 
Luis Potosi, Mexico, with 112,000 metric tons of annual capacity.  
 
USS-POSCO Industries (UPI)  
This is a joint venture between USX and Pohang Iron & Steel Co., Ltd (POSCO) of South 
Korea that owns and operates the former U.S. Steel Pittsburg, CA, plant. The joint venture 
markets high-quality cold-rolled sheets, galvanizing sheets, tin plate and tin-free steel, 
principally in the western United Stated market area. USS-POSCO’s annual shipment 
capacity is 1.4million tons, with hot bands principally provided by U.S. Steel and POSCO. 
Total shipments were approximately 1.7 million tons in 1997. 
 
USS/Kobe  
USX and Kobe Steel Ltd. of Japan participated in a joint venture that owns and operates 
the former U.S. Steel Lorain, Ohio Works. The joint venture operates a blast furnace and 
manufactures bar and tubular products. Bar products are sold by USS/Kobe, while U.S. 
Steel has sales and marketing responsibilities for tubular products. USS/Kobe’s annual 
raw steel capacity is 2.6 million tons, with iron ore and coke provided primarily by U.S. 
Steel. Raw steel production was approximately 1.9 million tons in 1997, with total 
shipments of approximately 1.6 million tons. 
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PRO-TEC 
This joint venture between USX and Kobe owns and operates a hot-dip galvanizing line in 
Leipsic, Ohio, geared towards the automotive and construction markets. The facility 
commenced operations in early 1993. Capacity is 600,000 tons per year, with substrate 
coils provided by U.S. Steel. PRO-TEC produced 671,000 prime tons of galvanized steel 
in 1997. In early 1997, USX and Kobe began construction of a second hot-dip galvanized 
sheet line at PRO-TEC with a yearly capacity of 400,000 tons. Startup of operations was 
projected for the third quarter of 1998. 
 
Double Eagle Steel Coating Company 
USX and Rouge Steel Company participated in a joint venture that operates an electro-
galvanizing facility in Dearborn, Michigan, focusing on automotive applications. Capacity 
is 870,000 tons annually,  with availability of the facility shared equally by the partners. In 
1997, Double Eagle produced approximately 853,000 tons. Besides, Olympic Laser 
Processing, in 1997, U.S. Steel Group and Olympic Steel formed a 50/50 joint venture to 
process laser-welded sheet steel blanks. U.S. Steel has a 46% equity interest in Transtar , 
which was formed in 1998 via the purchase of the domestic transportation businesses of 
USX, including railroads, a dock company, USS Great Lakes Fleet Inc., and Warrior & 
Gulf Navigation Company. Blackstone Transportation Partners and Blackstone Capital 
Partners together own 53% of Transtar. USX owns a 27% interest in RMI Titanium 
Company, a leading producer of titanium metal products. In 1996, 6.9 million shares of 
RMI common stock were sold in a public offering at a price of $18.50 per share, or $121 
million. Of this, USX sold 2.3 million shares and netted $ 40 million. Also in December 
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1996, USX issued $117 million of 6 3/4% Exchangeable Notes due February1, 2000, 
convertible into USX’s remaining interest in RMI common stock. The debt’s carrying 
value is adjusted quarterly to reflect changes in the value of RMI common stock.  
 
AS such, USS recognizes the importance of cooperation among companies within the 
industry in order to maintain competitiveness in the long run, especially under the WTO 
system which promotes borderless competition. In order to cope with the unprecedented 
competition in the 21st century, USS plans to make further efforts to strengthen global 
management, forge strategic alliances and create joint venture in line with its global 
management strategies. 
 
   < Table 2-1> U.S Steel Group, Income Statement, 1993-1998     (U$ million) 
                     ’93      ’94      ’95      ’96     ’97       ‘98  
Net sales             5,611    6,066    6,463    6,547    6,901    6,283 
Total cost & expenses   5,761    5,753    5,974    6,187    6,168    5,704 
Operating Income      (149)     313      488     360      733     579 
Net Income           (169)     201      303     275      452     364 
EPS (U$)            (4.04)     2.35     3.53     2.98     5.24     4.05 
Source : Company Report 
 
2) Nucor Corp 
 
Nucor is the largest mini-mill in the United States and one of the lowest-cost steel 
producers. Its main business is the manufacture of steel and steel-related products, 
including flat and long hot-rolled steel (sheet and coil, angles, channels, and pilings), 
cold-finished steel, steel joists and joist girders, steel deck, and steel grinding balls. With 
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headquarters in Charlotte, North Carolina, Nucor had a total of 7,200 employees at the 
end of 1998. Its shares are listed on the New Stock Exchange. Nucor has constructed all 
of its plants at Greenfield sites. Management has been the world’s leader in 
commercializing new steel-making technology to lower costs and expands its production 
capacities and product mix.  
 
Management Philosophy 
Nucor is known for its strong emphasis on employee relations, quality, productivity, and 
technological leadership. With a streamlined organizational structure, incentive-based 
compensation systems, rigorous quality systems, and with its aggressive pursuit of 
innovation and technical excellence, Nucor is able to attract and retain highly talented, 
productive and dedicated employees. Nucor is proud of the more than 7,000 employees 
that make up the total Nucor team. Employee relations at Nucor are based on four clear-
cut principles: 1) Management is obligated to manage Nucor in such a way that 
employees will have the opportunity to earn according to their productivity. 2) Employees 
should be able to feel confident that if they do their jobs properly, they will have a job 
tomorrow. 3) Employees have the right to be treated fairly and must believe that they will 
be. 4) Employees must have an avenue of appeal when they believe they are being treated 
unfairly. 
 
Technological Leadership 
Nucor’s strong emphasis on employee communication and commitment carries with it the 
commitment to provide the work force with the best technology available to get the job 
done right in a safe working environment. As evidence of that commitment, Nucor 
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aggressively pursues the latest advancements in steel making around the world to 
determine what technology it can adapt in its facilities. This pursuit of technical 
excellence lead to the joint venture with Yamato Kogyo of Japan to build Nucor-Yamato 
Steel Company in 1988. At Nucor-Yamato, Yamato-Kogyo’s technological expertise in 
structural beam blank casting was successfully combined with Nucor’s management 
philosophy and talented personnel to build one of the premiere structural steel mills in the 
United States. In addition, the Nucor Steel sheet mills in Indiana, Arkansas, and South 
Carolina represent a revolution in the thin slab casting. Nucor was the first “Mini-mill” to 
successfully commercialize the technology developed by a company in West Germany. 
 
Product Mix and Markets 
Nucor Steel has six Mini-mills, all continuous casting: Four produce long products, like 
bars and light structures (Darlington, South Carolina; Norfolk, Nebraska; Jewett, Texas; 
and Plymouth, Utah), and two produce sheet (Crawfordsville, Indiana, and Hickman, 
Arkansas). The Crawfordsville plant, started up in 1989, was the first Mini-mill in the 
world to use thin-slab casting technology to produce flat-rolled products. Called “compact 
strip production,” it was the first commercially viable process in which molten steel was 
cast into thin slabs (about two inches thick) and then rolled into hot bands in one 
continuous process. After the success of the Crawfordsville plant, a second Greenfield 
plant was constructed in Hickman, Arkansas, and began operation just 15 months after 
breaking ground in 1992. The two sheet-mill facilities have aggregate annual production 
capacity of 4 million tons.  
 
 
 22 
A third sheet-steel Mini-mill was constructed in Berkeley Country, South Carolina (near 
Charleston), for about $ 500 million; it has annual production capacity of 1.8 million tons 
and started up in early 1997. Nucor-Yamato Steel has Nucor’s seventh mini-mill (in 
Blytheville, Arkansas) and is a joint venture of Nucor (49%) and Yamato-Kogyo in Japan 
(51%). The plant produces I-beams, wide-flung beams, H-piles, and other heavy structural 
steel products and competes directly against the integrated steel producers. Nucor plans to 
contract a new 1,000 thousand tons-per-year steel mill to produce steel plate in Herford 
Country, North Carolina. The new facility is anticipated to cost more than $ 3million. 
Nucor’s capital expenditures in 1998 were $502.9 million and are presently projected to 
be over $ 425 million in 1999. These expenditures expand Nucor’s production facilities 
and also help to keep Nucor’s present facilities modern and efficient. The phrase of 
“Multilateral Strategic Alliance & Globalization” represents NUCOR’s domestic and 
global strategies: Preparing for the ever-intensifying competition in the 21st century based 
on its accumulated success. It plans to establish a thin-Slab factory in Thailand with the 
annual production capacity of 1.5 million tons in alliance with NSM to make inroads into 
the Southeast Asia market. It is a good example of Related Diversification & Vertical 
Integration of Business.  
 
<Table2-2> Nucor Corporation, Annual Income Statement, 1994-1998  (U$ million) 
                    ’94        ’95        ’96       ’97         ‘98 
Net Sales            2,976      3,462     3,647      4,185       4,151 
Total Cost & Expe’    2,619      3,030     3,259      3,724       3,736 
Net Earning           227        275      248        295        264 
EPS (U$)            2.60        3.14      2.83       3.35       3.00  
Source : Company Report 
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3-2.Europe 
 
Globalization of the steel industry in Europe has been limited to mainly the sphere of the 
EU. The interchange among the countries in Europe has been taken the shape of joint 
venture for the production of the special steel products. There were a lot of steel makers, 
which have combined their productions and distribution facilities in adjacent countries. 
Globalization of the European steel industry developed together with the trend of the 
unification of Europe, and in particular was applied in the field of production, marketing 
and R&D. From Usinor-Sacilor down, the steel makers in Europe have made an 
agreement with other companies on the joint ventures, or the establishment of service-
centers. 
 
1) British Steel  
 
British Steel is the world’s sixth- largest steel producer, shipping more than 16 million tons 
annually from four integrated steel works (Llanwern, Port Talbot, Scunthorpe, and 
Teeside) and several other steel-producing ventures. It accounted for 57% of the U.K 
market for finished steel products. Unlike most of its European competitors, British Steel 
has been private for a number of years (since December 5,1988). As a result, the company 
has successfully executed extensive operating and financial programs, which have 
transformed it into one of the lowest-cost integrated producers with negative net debt and 
an over- funded pension plan. The principal trading market for the common shares is the 
London stock exchange, while the ADRs are listed on the NYSE and Toronto stock 
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exchange. As of 1998, there were 46,500 employees in the worldwide. British steel 
maintains its head office in London and operates production sites on the European 
Continent, in North America, and in Asia. In December 1995, British Steel closed its 
seamless tube plant, marking the company’s exit from the seamless tube production. As 
result of shutdown, 520 employees were laid off. In November 1995, British Steel 
announced that it would defer the rebuilding and relining of its largest Blast Furnace. The 
delay in the overhaul was expected to generate saving of £50 –150 million. At the 
beginning of 1996, British Steel announced it would invest £70 million to modernize its 
Teeside and Scunthorpe works. The modernization, which would replace ingot production 
by continuous casting, was expected to raise product quality and reduce production costs. 
The company has also invested £60 million on a heavy section mill and a new arc furnace 
and on improvements to a slab caster.  
 
In April 1996, British Steel set up high- tech distribution center in the west midlands to 
make just in–time deliveries to the automotive industry. The distribution center costs 
£13.5 million and has fully operated in the later half of 1996. The equipment at the 
distribution center includes a press for stamping doors and other parts, and laser-guided 
cutting and welding machines. The investment helped British Steel increase the added 
value in its products and to enhance communications with its customers in the automotive 
industry. In November 1992, British Steel merged its stainless steel business with Avesta 
AB of Sweden to increase one of the largest European stainless steel producers, Avesta 
Sheffields. British Steel retained a 40% interest in Avesta Sheffield, which is quoted on the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange. In September 1994, British Steel brought its total ownership 
of Avesta Sheffield to 49.9% and further increased it to 51%  
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Globalization  
The company has two flat-rolled carbon steel Mini-mills in the United States: The first is 
an 800,000-tonne coil plate facility at Tuscaloosa, Alabama; the second is a 2.2-million-
ton sheet mill that is a joint venture with LTV Corp. and Sumitomo. They started 
production in late 1996 and early 1997, respectively. As part of the projects, British Steel 
relocated two DRI units to Alabama with total capacity of 900,000 tons. The DRI 
facilities started up at the end of 1997. Moreover, in September 1997, the company agreed 
to take a one-third stake in a steel tube manufacturer, Euro-pipe GmbH, which is currently 
a 50/50 joint venture between Germany’s Steel on the divestiture of Sogerail-Usinor’s 
railtrack production unit, which had 1997 sales of EUR 170 million (£ 185 million) 
 
Ownership Structure 
The UK.Steel industry has undergone substantial restructuring since World War II. British 
steel was formed in 1967 from major UK.Steel producers. In December 1988,the 
government privatized the company in an offering made in U.K, the United States, 
Canada, Europe, and Japan. In general, there are no restrictions on foreign ownership of 
British Steel. No specific UK laws or regulations restrict or affect the transfer of capital or 
payment of dividends, interest, or any other payments to U.S citizens or residents who are 
British steel stockholders. However, any one who has a material interest in the share 
capital equal to or in excess of 3%, or who has interests (material or not) equal to or in 
excess of 10%, is required to disclose that interest to the company.  
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<Table2-3>British Steel, Consolidated Income Statement,   1994-‘99E (£ million) 
                  ’94       ’95       ’96       ’97       ’98     ‘99E 
Turn-Over          4,191     4,784     7,048     7,224     6,947    6,213 
Operating Costs     4,075     4,338     6,107     6,848     6,682    6,474 
Net Profit           70        471      826       307      233     (260) 
Source : Company Report 
 
2) Ispat International N.V.  
 
Ispat International is a global steel producer with production operations in six countries: 
Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, Canada, Germany, Ireland, in addition to the United States, 
which it has just recently entered through the acquisition of Inland Steel Company. For 
the past six years, Ispat has achieved significant growth primarily from strategic 
acquisitions of under-performing, mostly government-owned assets around the world and 
turning them around through focused capital expenditure programs and implementation of 
better management practices. As a result, from 1992 to 1997 its steel shipments rose 37% 
per annum (from 1.5 million to 7.1 million tons) and sales increases by 47%, making Ispat 
one of the world’s fastest-growing steel producers. Ispat’s consolidated shipments would 
be reached 15.5 million tons in 1999, reflecting the acquisition if Inland. Ispat benefits 
from a broad geographic sales horizon and product base. Ispat produces a wide variety of 
steel products, including slabs, hot-rolled sheet, cold-rolled sheet, coated sheet, wire rod 
and structures. These products are sold to a wide range of world industries, including 
engineering, construction, automobile, and aircraft. With all of its steel-making facilities 
located near deep-water port facilities, Ispat has historically focused on the export market 
and has been able to shift its marketing focus to other markets as they become “ hot.” In 
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addition to steelmaking facilities, Ispat has iron ore mines (Mexico), iron ore pelletizer, 
direct reduced iron (DRI) plants, tube and wire making facilities, as well as ships and port 
handling assets. These assets provide Ispat with reduced production costs and provide the 
company with captive outlets for a portion of its steel production. Ispat is one of the 
lowest-cost, highest-quality steel producers in the world, as its plants employ the steel-
making platform of the future: the integrated Mini-mill. Its plants enjoy captive, high-
quality raw materials (primarily DRI, a scrap substitute) and a flexible, low-cost structure 
(electric arc furnace steel making). Ispat’s plants also benefit from captive deep-water port 
facilities, automated raw material handling system, large electric arc furnaces with 
continuous casters, and finishing lines. Besides its prowess of creating value through 
acquisition, Ispat has technical skills that are exceptional in the industry. It is the only 
steel producer in the world of using 100% DRI in the production of steel, and has 
experience with both types of DRI technology (HYL and Midrex). Ispat currently utilizes 
75% DRI in the production of steel. Furthermore, Ispat is the world’s largest producer and 
consumer of DRI. In August of 1997, the founding shareholder, Lakshmi N. Mittal, sold 
20% of the company in an initial public offering. The company only issued Class A 
common shares to the public, while the Mittal family maintained control of all of the 
Class B shares (which entitles the holder 10 votes per share). As a result, the Mittal family 
controls 96.8% of the combined voting power of the outstanding shares. 
 
Product Mix and Markets 
 
Ispat is the only truly global steel producer, with facilities in Mexico (8% of consolidated 
net sales in 1997), Canada and Ireland (30%), Germany (20%), and Trinidad (12%). The 
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geographic diversification of Ispat’s plants, along with a diverse product base and markets 
in 63 countries, enables Ispat to diminish the impact of geographical and product market 
downturns. Most other steel producers are home market forced and few have steelmaking 
facilities located outside of their home market. In 1997, about 50% of Ispat’s production 
was sold outside the country of production, with North America and Europe as the key 
markets. We believe Ispat possesses the ability to redirect sales to more profitable regions 
as the market dictates, given that all of its plants are located near deep-water port facilities 
and its products are of high quality. Ispat’s Mexican and Caribbean subsidiaries are the 
main drivers of earnings, given their growing capacity levels, high internal DRI utilization, 
as well as low material and labor costs. Imexsa and Caribbean Ispat contributed 62% of 
Ispat’s consolidated gross income in 1997, despite the fact that their sales represented only 
50% of the total. The slab and wire rod markets are Ispat’s most important markets-
representing about two-thirds of its revenue in 1997. Slab production is based solely in 
Mexico, where Ispat produced 3.2million tons in 1997. Through its capital expenditure 
program, Ispat should increase slab production to 4.4million tons by the end of 1999/early 
2000. Ispat exported 71% of its products to the U.S. and Canadian markets in 1994, as 
prices were high. However, as price started to decline in the region in the second half of 
1995, Ispat shifted its sales to Europe. As a result, sales to the United States and Canada 
declined to 55% of total sales, while sales to Europe increased to 23% from 1% (part of 
this increase was also attributable to the acquisition of IHSW, which sells most of its 
products in Europe). In 1996, as prices in North America start to rebound, Ispat increased 
sales to 58% in the region. 
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Strategy 
Ispat’s remarkable growth has relied heavily on acquisitions of state-owned steel 
operation via privatization. However, as most governments have already privatized their 
steel sectors, limiting Ispat’s traditional acquisition targets, Ispat is forcing on its efforts to 
make significant gains via private-sector acquisitions such as its September 1997 purchase 
of Thyssen’s Long Products division in Germany and recent acquisition of Inland steel 
company in the United States. It is expected that Ispat would be remained the main 
consolidator of steel assets in the world, given its high insider ownership structure and 
proven track record. Ispat is likely to continue to do strategic/opportunistic acquisitions in 
Latin America and in the United States and to continue to participate in European 
consolidation/divestitures of long products.  
 
Ispat is in the enviable position to expand its production capabilities at significantly lower 
costs than would be associated with typical Greenfield projects. Capital expenditure 
programs are an internal part of Ispat’s strategy to increase internal capacity and further 
reduce production costs. During 1997, Ispat completed a significant portion of its 
$600million, Phase 1, CAPEX program directed at the Mexican and Caribbean 
subsidiaries. The program: 1) expanded upstream integration into raw material sourcing; 
2) increased steel production capacities of both facilities; 3) further reduced cash costs of 
production; 4) made environmental improvements at CIL. Furthermore, Ispat has initiated 
the $215million second phase of its capital expenditure program that aims at further 
increasing capacity at Imexsa and increasing productivity and reducing costs at its 
German operations. 
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<Table 2-4> Ispat International Ltd., Income Statement, 1994-1999E  (U$ million) 
                     ’94      ’95      ’96       ’97      ’98     ‘99E  
 Net Sales 735      1,828    1,860     2,190    3,460    4,420 
 COGS 549      1,323    1,467     1,707    2,825    3,748 
 Operating Income  94       328      198      255      358      351 
 Net Income 246       556      613      289      275      123 
Source : Company Report 
 
3-3 Asia 
 
Globalization of the steel industry in Asia has also happened mostly within the Asian zone. 
Foreign direct investment and technical aid has been made from Japan, South Korea and 
Australia to China, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and India. In particular South Korea and 
Japan have expanded their export markets in accordance with the rapid industrialization of 
the developing countries. The steel makers and synthetic traders of Japan found large 
market in Malaysia and Thailand, and South Korea also launched in the foreign market of 
China and Vietnam, etc. In addition Taiwan has advanced in Malaysia, China, etc, and 
strengthened its cooperation with Germany and South Korea for the production of value 
added products. India, which has been aided by technical services from Germany, Japan 
and Russia since it operated it’s facilities as a type of government owned steel company, 
more recently set about for it’s joint ventures with the USA and other countries. 
 
1) Nippon Steel Corporation. 
 
Nippon Steel Corporation, the world’s largest steel maker, has the second- largest exposure 
to steel sheet products after Kawasaki Steel and the most diversified product mix among 
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the five largest Japanese steel makers. Besides steel making, Nippon Steel also produces 
titanium, chemicals, and semiconductors; develops electronics and information/ 
communication system; and engages in civil engineering and marine construction. 
Currently 80% of the company’s non-consolidated sales is derived from the steel-sector. 
Established in 1950, Nippon Steel is listed on the Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya stock 
exchanges in Japan. The workforce totaled 24,527 as of March 31,1997,down from 
34,619 at fiscal1994 year-end. Nippon Steel has 10 steelworks throughout Japan, with 
iron and steel making facilities concentrated at four locations - the Yawata, Nagoya, 
Kimitsu, and Oita works. During fiscal 1996, Nippon Steel worked out and implemented a 
strategy designed to respond to market trends under a single, unified system integrating, 
by product, the whole of manufacturing, marketing and research, and development 
resources. Furthermore, net annual cost savings targeted and achieved over the three-year 
period of the Medium-Team Business Plan totaled ¥ 300billion in all steel divisions on a 
non-consolidated basis. In response to deteriorating domestic steel market conditions - as 
sales of homes and automobiles remain weak, and as exports to Asia, its largest overseas 
market, are tumbling following Emerging Asia’s financial crisis in late 1997 - the 
company has decided to cut steel production by approximately 2.5% (or 640,000tonnes) 
during 1998.  
 
Product Mix and Markets 
Nippon Steel’s major product lines include rails, sheet piles, H-beams, bars, wire-rods, 
plates, hot-and cold-rolled sheets, surface-treated sheets, pipe and tubes, and stainless 
steel. In fiscal 1997, flat-rolled sheets and plates constituted 63% of all steel shipments, 
while tubular and others represented 28%, and sections 9%. In fiscal 1997, the company 
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shipped 25.9million tons of steel, equivalent to net sales of ¥ 2,185billion (or 80% of non-
consolidated sales). Major subsidiaries are Nippon Steel Metal Products (83%-owned), 
Osaka Steel Co.(54.9%),Daido Steel Sheet Corporation(50.7%),NS T(100%), and NS 
Kote (100%). Net sales from the Engineering sector represented 17% of non-consolidated 
sales, and net sales from the Chemical and other sector represented 3%. Exports 
accounted for 24% of non-consolidated sales. 
 
International Operation  
Having established manufacturing gases in North America during the latter half of 1980s, 
Nippon Steel shifted the focus of its overseas business development activity in the 1990s 
to South Asia and China. In the United States, Nippon Steel and Inland Steel Company 
(now owned by Ispat International) set up a joint venture, I/N Tek, in 1987. The operation, 
40%-owned by Nippon Steel, has annual finishing capacity of one million tons. Then, in 
1989, the same partnership established I/N Kote to produce high-grade coated sheets 
using continuous hot-dip galvanizing and electro-galvanizing lines. I/N Kote is 50%-
owned by Nippon Steel and has annual capacity of 900,000 tons. These joint ventures 
have allowed Nippon Steel to aid in meeting the local procurement needs of Japanese 
automobile makers in North America for high-grade cold-rolled and coated steel products. 
In December 1994, Nippon Steel established two joint ventures in China. One is 
Guangznou Pacific Tinplate Co.,Ltd., which began operations in 1997 and has the 
capacity to produce 120,000tonnes of tinplate annually. The other is Nantong Baogang & 
Nippon Steel Co. Ltd., which produces steel bars employing the electric furnace steel-
making process. This venture has an annual capacity of 240,000 tons and began 
operations in November 1996. Two joint ventures were established in Thailand in 1995. 
 33 
One, the Siam United Steel (1995) Co. Ltd.- scheduled to go on- line at the end of 1998 – 
had an annual capacity of one million tons of high-grade cold-rolled steel sheets for use in 
production of tinplate, automobiles, and home appliances. The other venture, Siam 
Nippon Steel Pipe Co., Ltd., began operations in January 1996, primarily producing steel 
pipe and tubes for automotive machine structures, with annual capacity of 20,000tonnes. 
 
Ownership Structure 
Ten Japanese corporations own 26% of Nippon Steel’s outstanding shares, including 
Nippon Life Insurance (3.9%), Mitsubishi Trust (3%), Industrial Bank of Japan (3%), and 
Mitsui Trust (3%), there are no particular restrictions on foreign ownership, except that 
the Securities and Exchange Law requires that foreign ownership in excess of 5% be 
reported to the Ministry of Finance. Foreigners hold about 7% of outstanding shares, and 
approximately 25% of total shares are held by investors owning 50,000 shares or less. 
 
  <Table 2-5> Nippon Steel Selected Financial Data  (¥ million), non-consolidated 
                          ’95               ’96               ’97   
 Net Sales               2,090,580          2,099,750         2,184,805 
 Operating Income          77,627            125,066          128,527 
 Net Before Tax            10,438             25,741           20,406 
 Total Assets            3,299,979          3,145,269         3,145,249 
Source : Company Report 
 
2) NKK Corporation.  
 
NKK Corporation is the world’s fifth- largest steel maker and ranks second in Japan, 
behind Nippon Steel. Founded in 1912 as Japan’s first manufacturer of seamless pipes, 
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NKK has expanded into steel making, shipbuilding, steel fabrication, construction, 
industrial machinery, and engineering. In recent years, NKK has diversified to take 
advantage of emerging opportunities fostered by the structural changes in Japan’s 
economy. The company entered into new fields of business, such as electronics, advanced 
materials, urban development, and computer systems. NKK currently has two main 
divisions, Steel making and Engineering; the latter comprises plant, energy, environmental 
engineering, construction, and urban development. NKK-listed on the Tokyo, Osaka, and 
Nagoya stock exchanges- maintains its principal office in Tokyo. In fiscal 1997, net sales 
from the steel division represented 61% of total non-consolidated net sales. NKK has six 
domestic steel works: Keihin, Fukuyama, Toyama, Tsurumi, and Shimizu. In fiscal 1997, 
NKK completed its three-year strategic restructuring program, which implemented a wide 
range of cost-reduction measures, including reduced consumption of energy and other 
resources, a smaller workforce, and the consolidation of production activities in the Steel 
and Engineering divisions. From 1992 to the end of fiscal 1996, NKK eliminated 50 
departments and 125 sections, and achieved personal reductions of 7,500 employees, 
translating into cost reductions totaling ¥200 billion. Upon completion of the restructuring 
program, NKK announced in March 1997 a new three-year management plan, whereby 
the firm pursued the following initiatives: strategic sales activities exploiting product 
strengths and diverse range; cooperation among divisions and marketing of key 
construction projects to increase steel product appliances; close coordination between 
manufacturing and sales departments to further upgrade product quality, delivery times, 
and cost-competitiveness; stepped-up exports to Asian markets and material supplies to 
NKK’s Thai joint venture to stimulate operations in Asia; and active promotion of short-
term projects tied to plant operations and next-generation R&D projects, including basic 
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research on new process. Recently, NKK announced plans to reduce steel production in 
1998, as domestic demand continues to decline, given weak sales of homes and 
automobiles, and as exports to Asia (its largest overseas market) tumble. The company 
also stated that it is stopping production of hot-rolled stainless steel sheet because of 
excess supply and low demand in Asia. Instead, the company would focus on steel plate 
and stainless-clad steel, which are used in construction. The decision to stop stainless 
sheet sales production reflects weak demand by automobile producers, which account for 
more than a third of sales of stainless sheet, used to make exhaust pipes. In May 1998, 
NKK announced that it is pulling out of the computer memory microchip business, which 
has been unprofitable. 
 
Asset and Product Mix 
Steel products sales accounted for 61% of NKK’s total non-consolidated fiscal 1997 sales 
on shipments of 10.2 million tons. NKK’s steel products include carbon, alloy, and 
stainless pipes and tubes (an area in which NKK excels); plate; hot-and cold-rolled sheet; 
surface-treated sheet; and bars and shapes. Major markets are the construction, 
automotive, shipbuilding, railroad, and electro-conductor industries. NKK has the second 
-highest exposure to pipes and tubes among the top-five steel producers in Japan, 
representing 16% of net non-consolidated steel sales in fiscal 1997. Net sales from plates 
and sheets accounting for 71% of net non-consolidated steel sales in fiscal 1997, while 
bars and shapes represented 7%. Exports represented 21% of net steel sales. 
 
International Operations 
NKK has major overseas joint ventures in Asia, the United States, Europe, South America, 
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Africa, Australia, and the Middle East. Among other holdings, NKK has a 67.6% voting 
interest and a 51.5% economic interest in National Steel in the United States. It is also the 
partner of National Steel and Dofasco Inc. of Canada in the operation of a continuous 
galvanizing line at DNN Galvanizing Corp. In Canada, which also makes hot-dipped 
galvanized steel sheets for automobiles. In Southeast Asia, NKK owns 40% of Thai 
Coated Steel Sheet Co., NKK’s first electro-galvanized sheet production base in the 
region. In 1996, NKK announced its agreement to enter into a joint venture with Vietnam 
Steel Corporation to build a crude steel plat in Vietnam’s northern Quang Ninh. The plant 
had an annual capacity of 500,000 tons and was operational by 1998. The venture, 
estimated to cost US$110 million, was 60%-owned by NKK and 40%-owned by Vietnam 
Steel Corp. In 1996, NKK strengthened its alliance with Sahaviriya, Thailand’s leading 
industrial conglomerate, by forming another joint venture. The new venture, Thai Cold 
Rolled Steel Sheet Public Co.,(TCR), boasts a new one million ton-per-year cold-rolling 
mill that has recently come on line 
 
Ownership Structure 
As of September 1997, nine Japanese corporations owned 27.5% of NKK’s outstanding 
shares, including Dai-Ichi Life Insurance (4.7%), Fuji Bank (3.7%), Nippon Life 
Insurance (3.4%), and Yasuda Life Insurance (3.4%). There are no particular restrictions 
on foreign ownership, except that the 5% rule of Securities and Exchange Law requires 
that foreign ownership in excess of 5% be reported to the Ministry of Finance. Foreigners 
held about 5% of the outstanding shares, and approximately 26% of all shares are held by 
investors owning 50,000 shares or less. 
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<Table 2-6>NKK Corp. Selected Financial Data (¥ million), non-consolidated 
                        ’95          ’96           ’97          ’98    
  Net Sales           1,171,879     1,159,742     1,185,043     1,112,052 
  Operating Income      12,066        64,949       63,407        51,880 
  Net Before Tax       (34,668)        68,353       47,220        17,197 
  Total Asset         2,103,839      1,936,978     1,887,710     1,955,869 
Source : Company Report 
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Part III .  Case Study of POSCO’s Globalization 
 
1. Company History 
 
POSCO (Pohang Iron & Steel Corporation) was founded in 1968, and in fewer than 25 
years, it emerged as the world’s second- largest producer, behind Nippon Steel of Japan.  
POSCO is the only integrated steel producer in South Korea. The company operates two 
integrated steel facilities in South Korea; Pohang and Kwangyang Works. Pohang Works 
and Kwangyang Works have annual production capacities of 12.2 million tons and 15.8 
million tons, respectively. The company produces hot- and cold-rolled steel, steel plates, 
wire rods, and stainless and silicon sheet and strip. Hot- and cold- rolled coils are the  
company’s two most important product lines, collectively accounting for more than 60% 
of sales and shipments. POSCO sells about 70% of its production in Korea, in which it 
has a 53% market share. The remaining 30% is sold in the export market, primarily to 
Japan, China, and Southeast Asia. 
 
In February 1997, POSCO agreed to purchase specialty steel businesses from the now-
bankrupt Sammi Steel Co. for \ 719.4 billion ($837 million). Overall, its growth history 
can be divided into four phases. The first phase is foundation-laying period that lasted 
from 1968, when it was founded, to 1973, when it started its first operations. In this period, 
the company focused both on earlier construction of the “Pohang Facility I” as a coherent 
process of manufacturing, and on earlier operation, as a result.  The construction cost per 
crude steel ton for this Pohang Facility I was $251, just 40 % of $667 for “CSC Facility I” 
of Thailand, which was built up in 1970s.  This strong price competitiveness has 
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thereafter served as the main driving force behind POSCO capturing the global 
competitive edge in the shortest period of time.  The company’s painstaking effort paid 
off.  In 1973, the year the company started its first operation, it earned \ 4.6 billion in 
operating profit.  The very next year, in 1974, the company recorded \ 35.5 billion in 
net profit, advancing the management stabilization much earlier than planned.  
 
The second phase, characterized as a period of quantum leap, covers from 1974 when the 
company started its major facility expansion, to 1985, when its 9.1 million per year 
production capacity started to be stabilized.  In those days, the company went one step 
further in beefing up its competitiveness, by cutting down on energy, resources, 
outsourcing cost, and inventories, thus improving its labor efficiency.  One thing 
noteworthy for this period is the fact that the company procured its facilities at the lowest 
possible cost, through open, competitive competition among world-class vendors.  
 
The third phase was the period of full-scale growth, which lasted from 1984 when the 
company began to construct Kwangyang steel plant, to October 1992, when the 
construction was completed.   In this period, POSCO concentrated its efforts on the 
completion of 21 million ton capacity production system, establishment of “one company 
two work plants system”, business globalization and diversification.   It was during this 
period also, that POSCO implemented the 2-phase internal capability-building project 
(1985-1987), aimed at achieving technology advancement, facility rationalization, high-
quality products, and efficient management. This project led to POSCO realizing  
\ 378.4 billion in expected profit.  
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As a part of its globalization effort, POSCO in 1986, founded a joint venture company 
UPI (USS-POSCO Industries) with US Steel, and in 1988 founded a local branch 
company PIO in Osaka, Japan.  Production cost saving and equipment efficiency 
maximization was also achieved, through “one company two plant works system.”  
Under this system, Pohang focused on “a variety of products in small amount” around 
high quality products, while Kwangyang focused on “a few kinds of products in mass 
amount,” around HR and CR coils.  Especially, the automization of entire process from 
production to shipping in Kwangyang works -- the 21st century’s state-of-the-art 
integrated steel plant-- has pushed it to the world’s no. 1 place in terms of production 
efficiency.   
 
The fourth phase was the period from 1993 to the present. POSCO has devoted its efforts 
both to maximizing customer satisfaction through not just price, but quality and 
technology competitiveness as well, and to laying the foundation to grow as a world-class 
global company.  To this end, POSCO has been restructuring and reengineering all the 
management processes resolutely, in order to bring in a new management system, where 
each and every employee is encouraged to exert his creativeness and capabilities to its full 
extent. Particularly, POSCO has successfully combined the traditional blast- furnace-based 
production with new innovative technologies like shin slab casting, to secure the most 
environment-friendly and competitive steel-making processes.  On production side, the 
company puts the highest priority in creating high-value added, by devising the most 
appropriate product mix.     
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2. Globalization  
 
POSCO commenced to create its overseas branches back in early 1980. As of the end of 
1998, POSCO has 48 businesses and 45 overseas branches. Out of 48 businesses, 15 are 
in operation, 6 under construction, 8 in the pipeline, and 19 on the boards.    
 
<Table 3-1> Overseas Subsidiaries of POSCO 
Major Subsidiaries in Operation 
  Company Name     Build-     Business         Owner   Major Share  
                     ing   (Thousand ton/Year)   ship(%)    Holder 
 U     POSAM       ’84    Steel Trade           100         - 
 S      (UPI)  ’86    Cold-Rolled, 1,440     (50)    USX 50 
 A      (SCI) ’89    Building Leasing      (100)         - 
Viet    POSVINA ’92   Galvanizing Flat ,50     50     SSC 50 
nam     VPS ‘94     Wire Rod ,200 35   POSTEEL 5, Daewoo 
                                                     10,VSC,etc 50 
        VINAPIPE    ’93         Flat, 30 15    VSC 50, Se-A 35 
 C   Dalian POSCO ’95       CGL ,100 40   POSTEEL 15,Sun- 
 H     - CFM                                        Jung 15,China 30 
 I     POS-Tianjin ’94    Coil Center, 100 10   POSTEEL 60, 
 N    Coil Center                                     Traders 40 
 A    Guangznou Jindo ’93   Container, 540 M  10   POA 2.5, Jindo 26 
                                                     China 49, Japan 12.5 
      POSINVEST ’95      Financing 50    Hanvit Bank 50  
Source : Company Report 
 
The main characteristics of overseas activities of POSCO are as follows.  First, overseas 
subsidiaries now in operation were mostly built up, in the form of the typical primitive 
overseas investment by steel industry, and thus covers the down-stream processes such as 
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Coil-Center, galvanizing flat mill, wire mill, Rod and Steel Pipe mill.   
 
Subsidiaries in Construction 
     Company Name      Location       Business     Owner  Major Share 
                                   Contents(Thu/Yr)  ship    holdrs 
 C   Dalian POSCO-CFM   Dalian dev’t’ zone color coated sheet 50   40    Posteel 15, China 30 
 H   Zhanjingang POSCO   Zhangjingang         CGL 100      90    Shagang Gr. 10 
 I    Zhangjingang Pohang  Zhangjingang        STS CR 110      80    Shagang Gr. 20 
 N        Stainless 
 A   Shunde Pohang Coated     Shunde          CGL 100        90     China 10 
     Shunde Xingpu Steel        Shunde        Coil Center 120   10     Samsung 39 
     Myanmar-POSCO         Yangon        CGL 30         80     UMEHL 20 
       SUS                Pakorn, Tailand    Cold-Rolled 910      3     Tailand 60 
East   POS-Thai             Pakorn,Tailand    Coil Center 120     18.5     Posteel 19.5  
Asia   KS-POSCO            Indonesia       Hot-Rolled 1,000   40     PTKS 40 
       POSNESIA            Indonesia         STS CR 75       70     METRO 30 
       POS-Hyundai           India           Coil Center 100    10     Hyundai 70.5  
South   POSVEN             Venezuela          HBI 1,500      40    Posteel 10 
Am’a   KOBRASCO            Brazil         PELLET 4,000     50     CVRD 50  
 
<Table 3-2> Overseas Subsidiaries of POSEC  
Subsidiaries in Operation                          (unit : U$ thousand) 
 Corporation Location   Business    Cap.(th/yr)  Build Capital Invest  Share(%) 
 POSLILAMA     Vietnam      Structural        15     10,’96      17,119      60 
POSEC EUROPE    U.K       Engineering        -       2,’95       5,000     100 
(DAVY DISTINGTON)   U.K       Engineering        -       4,’95      (5,455)     55 
      SUM                                                      22,119 
Note: DAVY DISTINGTON is a subsidiary of POSEC EUROPE, so the amount of 
capital investment was not accounted in the total capital investment. 
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Subsidiaries in Construction                         (unit : U$ thousand) 
  Corporation     Location      Business       Capital Invest   Total Equity    Ownership(%) 
  POS-PLAZA      China       office building   186,450       62,373        100 
Zhangjingang Pier    China        pier            12,500        5,000         90 
DIAMOND-PLAZA  Vietnam     office building    91,942       23,354         60 
POSEC-HAWAII     USA        senior house     73,900        9,500        100 
 Other Affiliates(2)  Russia, etc    office building   635,190      150,000        10-12 
     Sum                                     999,982      250,277 
 
In this type of foreign investment focusing on down-stream, POSCO exports hot- and 
cold-rolled coils, and process/sell them to local markets’ taste.  This foreign direct 
investment (FDI) served two different purposes: 1) it provided POSCO with a strong and 
solid foothold for export, and 2) it served as a POSCO’s strategic demand 
creation/production basis, through which POSCO can explore local steel market.   
 
Second, looking at the foreign investment that is either under construction or in 
conceptual stage, one thing is quite noteworthy: Although the big chunks of them still 
focus on the same down-stream process, some belong to upper stream.  They are a 1-
million ton capacity mini mill and a flat mill with capacity of 75 thousand tons in 
Indonesia, and a mini-mill in Vietnam.  FDI in down-stream process, where the factories 
usually start to operate with less than 100 thousand ton capacity to be later on gradually 
expanded, requires a small amount of initial investment, therefore relatively little risk is 
involved.  In contrast, FDI in upper-stream process, where factories start out with bigger 
capacity, requires higher investment cost and thus involves higher risk.        
 
Thirdly, among the POSCO’s FDI, some FDI are made not to produce steels, but to 
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support the steel-production.  Examples are an overseas branch of POSTEEL, a 
sales/marketing subsidiary of POSCO, and overseas branch of POSEC, a 
construction/engineering-supporting subsidiary, and an overseas branch to support 
financial areas.  
 
Fourthly, some FDI were done for the main purpose of either securing iron ore and raw 
material coals, or producing intermediary goods.  Fifthly, POSCO’s overseas activities 
are mostly done in the form of joint venture, instead of POSCO covering 100% of the 
required investment cost.  POSCO’s joint venture-partners are various: domestic Korean 
conglomerates and foreign advanced steel makers, let alone local steel and steel-related 
company, POSTEEL/POSEC (two subsidiaries of POSCO).  These partners and POSCO 
have jointly raised funding and put out the investment money.  One benefit of these joint 
ventures was both financial burden and risk being reduced, with the possibility of tie-up 
with the joint venture partners being increased.  
 
<Case Analysis : POSVINA in Vietnam> 
  
Vietnam, as the export outpost of POSCO, was the first South East Asian country for 
POSCO to go into.  POSCO began joint ventures with Vietnam, even before the Korean 
government open official ties with the Vietnam government, since Vietnam is a potentially 
important market in that it is located at the heart of the 100 million people of Indo-china 
peninsula spanning Vietnam, Raos and Cambodia. The steel demand from Vietnam was 
tiny at 15 Kg per person in 1996.  However, if this expands little bit to reach the point of 
100 Kg per person, Vietnam will become a highly prospective market with annual demand  
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of 7.5 million ton.  POSCO’s strategy with Vietnam is to make a pre-emptive investment 
to preoccupy this market. 
  
POSVINA, POSCO’ joint venture company in Vietnam that was established in 1992, has 
been growing successfully, after making profit at its founding year and 7 straight years of 
black ink.  POSVINA was founded jointly with SSC, a Vietnamese steel company, on 
joint investment of 3.9 million dollars (POSCO invested 1.95 million dollars in cash, with 
SSC taking care of the remaining portion in kind). Currently, this company is being run 
without any borrowings from outside put in.  POSVINA, with an annual capacity of 
50,000 ton, is predominantly producing galvanized plates as a material for household 
roofs.  It produced 40,000 tons in 1996, which was translated into 30 million dollars in 
sales.   
 
The secret of the success of POSVINA is two-fold: selection of the products with higher 
marketability and high quality products.  A big jump in the Vietnamese people income 
level led to a growing demand for the galvanized plate, a product produced by POSVINA.  
And the local Vietnamese construction companies preferred POSVINA’s products, which 
are relatively high in price but excellent in quality.  One competitive advantage of 
POSVINA was the fact that it enjoyed a stable provision of raw material from POSCO.  
In 1995, when its competitors suffered from a steep rise in steel price, POSVINA was able 
to get raw materials at a relatively lower cost, which led to 4.71 million dollars in black 
ink.  But from 1996, the number of the competitors started to grow, causing a glut in 
supply, which in turn led POSVINA to a plummeting profit.  With the competitors from 
Japan and other countries rushing into this market, competition is ever increasing.  
 46 
3. Performance Analysis of Globalization 
 
The recent business performance of overseas branches of POSCO and its subsidiary 
POSEC vary from one country to another.  In the U.S., POSAM and UPI have recorded 
profit for the last 3 years.  In Vietnam, however, only POSVINA is making money, with 
VPS and VINAPIPE remaining in red ink.  In China, most of the overseas branches are 
losing money.  Based on this, it may be said that other than investment into the U.S., 
POSCO’s globalization efforts have not been a success.  Still, it seems unfair and unjust 
to only look at their recent few years’ performance, to evaluate overseas branches’ 
business performance.   
 
It took quite long years before POSAM and UPI in the U.S. started to make profit.      
Usually, it takes lots of time and effort for a particular business to start to move into a 
black ink beyond a mere break even point.  In case of those POSAM and UPI, the initial 
investment was put in mid 80’s, which was followed by a long period of painful suffering 
before the current black ink.  
 
The investment into China and Vietnam which started in 90’s is in its earlier stage, where 
there are problems of lack of economy of scales, limitations with operation technology 
and productivity.  Performance of these investments will be all determined by the speed 
with which the challenges of increased demand and productivity are met. 
 
In other words, the key to success of these investments is not the immediate few years’ 
gain or loss but how POSCO will create/secure demand for these businesses, achieve  
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economy of scale, increase productivity through improved operation technology and 
stable labor/management relationship, and ultimately turn to black ink.  These corporate 
activities to shorten the time taken to reach BEP are at the very heart of the POSCO’s 
global management.  
 
Any company that wants globalization needs core capabilities.  To evaluate what are the 
key capabilities that have driven POSCO’s globalization, firstly it is the capability to 
choose right investment locations and product items.  This, in other words, is to make 
right decisions on what to produce and where to sell, which requires a clear understanding 
of situation in target markets and sharp insight into the company’s own cost and quality 
competitiveness.  
 
Positive sides with the POSCO globalization include 1) its ownership structure that is as 
efficient as that of a private company despite POSCO being a public entity and 2) 
POSCO‘S globalization strategy was developed based on the past experiences of Japanese 
blast furnace companies.  In short, POSCO’s globalization was successful, in terms of 
the selection of where and what to produce (East Asia including China and down-stream 
processes). 
 
In terms of the profitability, there are not a few overseas branches that are losing money.  
This, however, is deemed to be an inevitable phenomenon in earlier stage of the foreign 
investment. And only if the market conditions get stabilized, this undesired phenomena is 
likely to be turned around over time.  The key issue in terms of profitability is how much 
the time taken to reach BEP can be shortened, which depends primarily on overseas 
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branches’ efforts at market exploration, improved operation technology aimed at 
productivity increase, and stabilized labor/management relationship.  The East Asian 
market including China seems, on condition of their national economies’ long-term, 
steady growth, to emerge as the heart of the global steel industry.  
 
Secondly, POSCO’s technological capability, POSTEEL’s trade/marketing capability, 
POSEC’s construction/engineering capability came together to lead to a successful 
implementation of POSCO globalization.  Out of these capabilities, what is most 
important is POSCO’s technological capability, which is deemed to be the world’s best.  
However creative a company was in selecting the investment location and items, this 
investment will be difficult to generate any economic effect, without the needed 
technological capability there. Some studies found that especially, in the steel industry, the 
key element of the competitiveness is operation technology. 
 
Here, one concern is the labor/management relationship in POSCO’s overseas branches. 
POSCO has traditionally kept a very strict and stern corporate culture.  This strong, 
deep-rooted tradition has survived even the inflow of the U.S-style corporate culture, 
ultimately to be recognized as a valuable asset of POSCO.  
 
This POSCO-style labor-management relationship can not work in overseas branches, 
however.  Therefore, as POSCO’s globalization progresses further, a labor-management 
relationship model that fits into the particular local situation/culture shall be developed, 
too.  Without this done successfully, operation technology it alone can not increase the 
productivity.  
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Thirdly, POSCO has enjoyed a strong capability to raise fund to support global financial 
management. POSCO is deemed to possess a substantial fund-raising capability both in 
direct and indirect financial markets, based on its high credit ratio, which was backed up 
by its physical competitiveness and healthy financial structure.  And POSCO itself has 
considerable amount of investment capability coming from its huge net profit, which can 
give financial support to POSCO’s globalization, while overcoming the market entry 
barrier of need for large amount of money.  
 
<Table3-3> Performance of POSCO’s Selected Overseas Subsidiaries (U$ thousand)  
  Company           Opera-      1995           1996           1997  
   Name              tion    Sales   Profit   Sales   Profit   Sales   Profit 
 USA    POSAM      1984  212,814  1,348  272,977  4,106  310,454  6,354 
         (UPI)    1986  (771,446)  (12,715)  (815,373)  (9,085)  (882,551)  (30,060) 
         (SCI)        1989  (13,192)  (1,883) (1,515)   (1)    (1,134)  (-230) 
 Vietnam POSVINA     1992   35,421  5,907  30,085   1,037   20,501   395 
         VPS         1995   4,348   -385   26,722   -4,384  45,798  -3,347 
        VINAPIPE     1994   8,540   -753    11,318  -285   13,655   -508 
 China  Dalian POSCO  1995     -       -      -       -    8,090   -1,090 
        POS-Tianjin    1994    166     -80  14,872   -123   26,816     11 
        Guangznou Jindo  1993   98,142  3,521  80,900   -4,925 106,829  -2,321 
        POSINVEST   1995     -       -      -       -    37,000    -295 
 Note : Profit is the figure of before tax,  Source : Company Report 
 
POSCO, even in its early days of foundation in 1968, has successfully implemented the 
“integrated steel-producing process,” which seemed something impossible to the eyes of 
the overseas steel industry.  What is underlying POSCO’s corporate culture is the “Yes, 
you can” and “can-do” spirits.  Although, as mentioned earlier, POSCO’s ownership 
structure has some problems typical of all the other public entities, still it has a stronger 
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adventurism and willingness to take risk, compared to foreign companies.   
 
The fourth factor is that POSCO is judged to possess a strong capability to get those 
information that are critical for global management. The sources from which POSCO 
collects these information are various: From POSTEEL comes the information on 
business trade. From POSRI comes the information it has collected during its R&D 
activities.  Another source of information is advanced foreign steel companies with 
which POSCO has tie-ups.  For the past 30 years, POSCO has accumulated the 
capability to collect and analyze information not just on steel industry but on other kinds 
of information needed for performing business activities overseas.  This ability to 
get/analyze information combines with its another ability to choose right investment 
location and product items, to create a synergy effect.  
 
The fifth factor is the core capability of POSCO’s joint venture partners, considering the 
fact that POSCO’s globalization is performed mostly in the form of joint venture, rather 
than independently. For POSCO to make best of its partners’ core capability, it is very 
important for POSCO to select right partners and to properly split up the 
roles/responsibilities between POSCO and its partners.  There is a mixed evaluation on 
whether POSCO has so far chosen right partners in light of their core capabilities.  As 
for the joint ventures in China, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Brazil, the key partners are the 
local steel companies.  Their strengths lie in the fact that they are very familiar with the 
local situations and can facilitate the communication with the local government.  Their 
weakness, however, lies with their poor technological capability.  
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More fundamental problem with the POSCO’s globalization efforts is like this.  First, 
there is no clear definition of what POSCO’s globalization is for. Out of the possible 
objectives like profitability, stability, technological advancement, management efficiency 
increase, smoother corporate financial activities, exactly what is the objectives of the 
POSCO’s globalization?  And, in potential areas of globalization like production, raw 
material coal procurement, marketing/sales, R&D/product development, corporate 
ownership structure, business portfolio, exactly where does POSCO wants to do 
globalization?  There are criticisms that POSCO lacks a clear and solid vision/blueprint 
of its global management, and if any, it is being shaken due to the instability with the 
corporate control. Looking at POSCO’s global management so far, it seems that POSCO’s 
globalization has three key objectives of 1) expansion of global market 2) based on this 
expanded global market, accomplishing the economy of scale in domestic steel production, 
and 3) stable provision of raw material and substitutes.   
 
Secondly, globalization needs people, organization and software to be there for its 
implementation. It is questionable if POSCO possess the right people, organization and 
software. This problem may be interpreted as one aspect of POSCO traceable back to its 
ownership structure. In 1996, POSCO, in an effort to respond to fast-changing business 
environment, put together the organizational units related with overseas businesses that 
were scattered around, to launch the “Overseas Business Headquarter.” The basic idea, 
here, was to put together talented staffs in various areas like finance, technology, 
procurement, etc, in order to establish a system where as soon as the feasibility of a 
overseas business is verified, these staffs’ accumulated capabilities in various areas can be 
readily combined together.           
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Launching of this Headquarter itself is judged a step forward toward the globalization.  
The functions this headquarter has performed, however, was quite nominal, not 
substantial enough to combine together the corporate capabilities for a more rational 
decision-making.   
 
Thirdly, based on the fact that global management is one of the corporate activities that 
require huge amount of resources, all the resources put into POSCO globalization should 
be looked at in terms of opportunity cost.  Here, the key is how POSCO can strike the 
right balance between expansion of domestic businesses and overseas investment.  
 
Assuming the domestic demand for steel getting sluggish in the future, making right 
choice between business diversification in the domestic market and getting more 
proactive in the overseas steel market is hugely imperative.  As POSCO’s past 
experience with domestic business diversification into mobile telephone, and IT 
businesses tells, diversification does not necessarily guarantee a high profit.  This is true 
also of the overseas investment.  
 
AS for the overseas investment, the plan to invest in a mini-mill in Indonesia was 
cancelled out due to skepticism about its economics involved.  Then, here comes the 
most important decisions to be made: 1) What is going to be the total amount of the 
investment to be put in? and 2) How can the investment resources be best split between 
domestic business expansion and overseas investment?  Here the key seems to be the 
kind of corporate ownership structure that allows a rational decision-making and software 
that can guarantee a decision made in a scientific way.  
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The harsh reality with POSCO is that we can not easily say that POSCO possess these two 
keys above mentioned.  One lesson to be learned from the experience with the world’s 
best companies is that if the decision on resource allocation is made only on CEO’s 
intuition, the investment is highly likely to become a failure.          
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IV. Conclusion 
 
Japanese steel-makers were the early participants in the globalization trend during the 
1980s, as they took direct quickly stakes in U.S. steel companies such as Armco and 
National Steel and formed joint ventures with Inland Steel, LTV, U.S Steel, and Wheeling 
Pittsburgh Steel. These moves were made by the Japanese to support domestic 
automotive customers with newly established transplants in the U.S market. Another 
motivating factor for the Japanese move into the United States was to reduce their risk of 
being shut out of the U.S market by trade sanctions. Facilitating the Japanese move into 
the United States was the extremely low-cost financing made available by the Japanese 
financial institutions. Today, extremely tight credit availability coupled with highly 
leveraged balance sheets and a poor earnings outlook severely limit the capability of 
Japanese steel companies to make additional consolidation moves in the world. 
 
Ispat’s high insider ownership along with a visionary management team have provided it 
with the ability to take calculated risks in privatizations worldwide, making it the truly 
global steel producer, with operations in six different countries. Ispat’s growth strategy 
has been focused on the acquisition, at low costs, of under-performing integrated Mini-
Mills formerly owned (and mismanaged) by governments. The company now has gone 
away from privatizations, given the limited opportunities, and has focused on the 
acquisition of privately owned steel assets. Most recently, Ispat acquired Thyssen’s Long 
Products division in Germany and entered the U.S. steel market through the acquisition 
of Inland Company. 
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British Steel has also been active – branching out in Europe and United States. Currently, 
British Steel is a participant in a joint venture with LTV and Sumitomo in Trico, a Mini-
mill in the United States. British Steel has also achieved full-scale globalization interests 
via its ownership of Tuscaloosa Steel in the United States, and through a 51% ownership 
stake in stainless steel producer Avesta Sheffield in Sweden. British Steel has stated that 
it is pursuing further globalization opportunities for growth in both steel production and 
distribution.  
 
There are several issues to be overcome in relation to POSCO’s intended globalization.   
Increased competitiveness and expansion of existing overseas activity 
POSCO’s focus needs to change from one principally concerned with domestic demand to 
one of export. Recognition is required by POSCO to further develop its export strategies 
and activities. Accordingly, POSCO should redirect its efforts by securing a stable base of 
long term customers within the global steel market in order to maximize its profit. This 
contrasts with current management strategies of satisfying domestic demand at low prices 
with exports being met from residual supply.  
 
Also, with current overseas joint ventures, POSOC needs to shorten the time required to 
surpass the break-even-profit point. The performance of POSCO’s foreign direct 
investment can be improved by: 
· securing increased foreign demand for its products 
· ensuring production capacity to achieve these higher levels of demand 
· increased labor productivity through improved labor force skills and effective 
industrial relations policy 
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Current foreign direct investment is of a small capacity, usually less than 100,000 tons of 
output per year.  In this regard, improvements through economies of scale are achievable.  
 
Globalization and the importance of the governance structure 
A company’s governance structure has an important influence on policies relating to 
globalization. This includes: 
· Location of production facilities 
· The types of products to produce 
· The balance between exports and foreign direct investment 
· The choice between domestic operations and foreign direct investment 
· Globalization strategies 
Effective policies can only be achieved within POSCO with creative and innovative 
management taking these factors into account. Another issue affecting this is POSCO’s 
changing ownership structure over time.  Since it’s foundation in 1968, ownership 
structure has changed many times through the sale of government shares, the introduction 
of domestic market ownership, employee stock sharing plans, and foreign shareholdings.  
As a result, the government’s and the KDB’s share of ownership has been dramatically 
reduced.  Foreign ownership is now 38.34% (December 1998).  However, this level of 
foreign ownership does not ensure a policy aligned with globalization strategies. 
 
However, in the future, the majority distribution of ownership will be an important factor 
affecting management policy regardless of whether these be domestic or foreign 
shareholders. 
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